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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
_MICHAEL MUKASKEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

ROBERT S. AARON,
Defendant and Respondent.

11088

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE1\1ENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages for personal
injuries arising out of an automobile accident.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Seventh Judicial District Court, at a Pretrial
hearing, granted a summary judgment of No Cause of
Action in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the entry of the summary judgment and seeks a decision remanding the
case for trial by jury.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Amended Complaint alleges that on the 3rd
day of August, 1963, plaintiff was riding as a passenger
in a 1963 Chevrolet automobile being driven by the
defendant. That near the City of Huntington, Emery
County, State of Utah, defendant so negligently ancVor
willfully misconducted himself in the operation of said
automobile as to cause an accident which resulted iii
plaintiff suffering severe personal injuries.
Defendant answered the Amended Complaint and
admitted plaintiff was a passenger in the automobile,
but denied defendant was negligent or guilty of willful
misconduct. As an affirmative defense, defendant
alleged he was driving the automobile as the agent
or under the control of plaintiff and therefore, his negligence, any, was imputed to plaintiff.
In reply to the defense of imputed negligence,
plaintiff claimed the parties were engaged in a joint
enterprise and therefore, the negligence of the def end·
ant driver would not be imputed to plaintiff.
Defendant filed :Motions for Summary Judgment
In support of these motions, defendant had publisheJ
and introduced into evidence the depositions of th1
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parties. In these depositions, the parties testified to
their legal relationship and the facts surrounding the
accident.
Plaintiff testified he and the defendant were school
friends and residents of the New York City area; that
during the summer of 1963 they decided to travel together to the western part of the United States, and,
particularly to Utah and Colorado area to look for
employment on oil rigs. They secured transportation
for tlteir trip by answering an ad in the New York
Times which offered rides to Denver and California
on a share expense basis. After arriving in Colorado,
they lived and worked in several towns, including Craig,
Colorado, and on August 2, 1963, returned to the City
of Denver. Up to this point they shared equally all
of their expenses for lodging, food and transportation.
lVhile in Denver, they decided to continue their
trip west and travel to the State of California. An
additional reason for selecting this state was to enable
defendant to visit his brother. To obtain transportation
for this journey, the parties answered a newspaper
ad of the Atlantic Pacific Driveaways Company which
furnished to qualified applicants an automobile to be
driven to California.
In order to qualify for this automobile, it was
necPssary to post a $25.00 deposit and execute a written eontract with the company. Due to the financial
l'ondition of defendant, plaintiff consented to make the
deposit and sign the contract. It was agreed, however,
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that defendant had equal right to drive the automobile.
It was also agreed that defendant would repay one
half the deposit, or $12.50 and pay one half of all of
the operating expenses.
The contract was general in nature and by its terms
transferred possession of the automobile to plaintiff.
(Ptf. Dep. pgs. 8-20}.
The defendant, by his deposition, verified all of ,
the facts testified to by the plaintiff. (Dft. Dep. pgs.

5-12}.

After completing these arrangements with the
company they received a 1963 Chevrolet automobile
and started their trip to California.
In describing the accident, the parties testified that
after leaving Denver they alternated driving and slept
in the automobile that evening. The following day,
defendant started driving and immediately prior to the
accident was traveling at a speed of approximate]\'
50 miles per hour. Defendant testified that he suddenly
approached a curve and because of his speed was unable
to negotiate the same and the automobile left the highway and overturned. Plaintiff testified that just prior
to the accident he had been sleeping and awakened
just as the automobile entered the curve. Plaintiff admitted that prior to this point in the journey defendant
had evidenced reasonable care in the manner in which
he drove the automobile. (Dft. Dep. pgs. 16-19).
Defendant contended the testimony from these
depositions established, as a matter of law, there was
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no issue of fact regarding the claim of either joint enterprise or willful misconduct. On two separate occasions,
Judge Keller and Judge Ruggeri denied Motions for
summary judgment. At the conclusion of the pretrial
conference, however, defendant, over the objection of
plaintiff, again moved for a dismissal. This time, Judge
Ruggeri granted the .Motion. In rendering this decision,
the court stated as follows:

"***

The Court feels that, the Court was
about - - - let me say, to grant the Motion at
the time the matter was overruled, and felt that
there might be some question of fact as argued
by counsel for the plaintiff in his memorandum,
that there might be some question of fact. The
Court is of the opinion that there is no question
of fact; * * * and it is ordered that Summary
Judgment be had * * * in favor of defendant
and against plaintiff."
It is the entry of this judgment which is the subject
of this appeal.

POINT I

TO JUSTIFY SU~1MARY JUDGMENT,
I • THERE MUST BE NO GENUINE ISSUE OF
FACT PRESENTED.

1

As previously stated, the pretrial judge, in granting
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ruled
there was no genuine issue of fact concerning either
tl1e legal relationship between the plaintiff and defendant or whether defendant was guilty of willful mis-
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conduct in the manner in which he drove the auto.
mobile. If an issue of fact existed with respect to these
matters, then the trial court committed error. See
Young vs. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P. 2d 862· .
Morris vs. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P. 2d
298.
I

In Abdulkabir vs. Western Pacific Railroad Company, 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 2d 339, this court stated:
"We are in accord with the idea that the right
of trial by jury should be scrupulously safe·
guarded. This, of course, does not go as far as to
require the submission to a jury of issues of fact
merely because they are disputed. If they would
not establish a basis upon which plaintiff could
recover, no matter how they were resolved, it
would be useless to consume time, effort and
expense in trying them, the saving of which is
the very purpose of summary judgment procedure. The pertinent inquiry is whether under
any view of the facts the plaintiff could recover.
It is acknowledged that in the face of a motion
for dismissal on summary judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to have the trial court, and this
court on review, consider all of the evidence
which plaintiff is able to present, and every inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom :
in the light most favorable to him."
With this controlling rule in mind, plaintiff will
now move on to a consideration of whether the pleadings and depositions and statements made at the pre·
trial conference present a genuine issue of fact that
should have been presented to a jury.
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POINT II
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED
ERROR IN RULING THE PARTIES WERE
NOT ENGAGED IN A JOINT ENTERPRISE.
It is a well accepted principle of law that the legal
relationship of a joint enterprise or joint venture may
exist between a driver of an automobile and a passenger
riding with him. It is also well accepted that in this
relationship the negligence of the driver is not imputed
to the passenger so as to preclude recovery in an action
between the two members of the joint enterprise. This
legal proposition is set forth by the following authorities:
In 8 Am. Jur., 2d, Automobiles, Sec. 681, P. 233,
is stated:
"The negligence of one member of a joint
enterprise driving a motor vehicle may not be
imputed to another member of the joint enterprise riding with him, for the purpose of precluding liability of the former to the latter for
personal injuries resulting from the negligent
operation of the vehicle. In other words, where
one joint adventurer is guilty of a tortious act
in the operation of a motor vehicle to the damage
of an associate in the joint venture, he must respond in damages."

In the annotation 62 A.L.R. 440, 85 A.L.R. 630, appears the following:
"The rule announced in the reporting case
that the doctrine of imputed negligence is in-
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applicable to a member of a joint enterprise
or common adventurer injured as a result of
negligence of the owner or operator of an auto.
mobile while using it within the scope of the
enterprise while the act is between the parties to
the enterprise, has been followed or at least
recognized in the following cases. * * *"

It is also a well accepted principle of law that in
cases involving joint enterprise, a determination of the
issue is a matter which should be presented to a jury.
See Robinson Transportation Co., et aL, v. HawkeyeSecurity Insurance Company, 385 P. 2d 203, wherein
the Wyo ming Court, in ref erring to another case,
stated:
"Where the existence of the relationship is '
in issue, the question is pre-eminently one for
the finder of fact."

In Howard v. Alta Chevrolet Company, et al.,

243 P. 2d 804, the California Court stated as follows:

"The law is well settled that in order to come ~
within the joint enterprise rule, a passenger in
an automobile must either exercise control or
have the right to exercise control over its operation. * * * Whether or not such a right of control
exists depends upon the circumstances in each
particular case, and usually depends up?n sereral questions of fact which are for the Jury to
determine in light of the applicable prineiples
of law."
See Re-Statement of Law, Torts 2d, Section .t.91
( c) wherein it is stated:
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"The elements which are essential to a joint
enterprise are commonly stated to be four: (I)
an agreement, express or implied, among the
members of the group; (2) a common purpose
to be carried out by the group; ( 3) a community
of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among
the members; and ( 4) an equal right to a voice
in the direction of the enterprise, which gives
an equal right of control. Whether these elements exist is frequently a question for the jury,
under proper direction from the court."
This court, in a number of decisions, has set forth
the requirements necessary to establish this legal relationship of joint enterprise in automobile cases.

In the early case of Derrick v. Salt Lake Railway
Cumpa11,1;, 50 Utah 573, 168 P. 335, plaintiff was a
passenger in a car being driven by the owner. Both
parties were salesmen and were traveling to Northern
Ctah and Idaho when they collided with defendant's
train at a crossing. The evidence revealed the parties
had planned the trip together and plaintiff was to pay
~ ~ his proportionate share of the expenses. Based on this
testimony, defendant requested the court to instruct
lthe jury on the theory of joint enterprise and imputed
Jl negligence. The trial court refused. In reversing this
h
ruling, this court stated as follows:

to

ll

"The undisputed evidence shows that the automobile trip was a joint affair in which :Merritt
and plaintiff were mutually and equally interested, and in which their rights to direct and
govern the conduct of each other in relation
thereto were coextensive. Each had a voice and
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the right to be heard in regard to the details of ,
the tri,p. Merritt testified that 'the arrangements
were equal; that is ,they were mutual among
us all.' He further testified: '\Vhen we started
we had agreed to take lots of time and not drive
fast. We discussed this on the way out,' and
that 'it was clearly understood' that each would
pay his share of the expenses of the trip. Plaintiff testified that costs of the trip included gasoline, oil, tires, 'wear and tear on the car, and
other expenses connected with the trip.'
The contractual relations of plaintiff and his
traveling companions were substantially the
same as they would have been if they had jointly
hired an automobile with which to make the trip,
with the understanding that they woud jointly
pay the expenses and mutually and concurrently
direct the journey and the details thereof. The
trip was therefore a joint enterprise in which
these parties had a community of interest and
in which they all equally had a voice and a right
to be heard respecting the details of the journey.
Under these circumstances the negligence of
Merritt in the management of the automobile
at the time of the collision was imputed to plaintiff. * * *
Under the law applicable to the admitted facts
defendant would have been entitled to have the
jury instructed, if it had so requested, that if
they should find that Merritt was negligent, such
negligence, as a matter of law, would be imputed
to plaintiff."
This rule was followed in Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah ,
179, 117 P. 2d 224, and Hill v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2rl
164, 417 P.2d 664.
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In Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1045,
.Justice \ Volfe discussed the theory of joint enterprise
as follows:
"In several of the cases there were slight circumstances beyond the mere owner's presence; in
others there are loose statements of there being
a 'joint enterprise' or 'common purpose,' when
the common purpose was only a destination or
a pleasure ride such as any guest might participate in. Certainly where a driver invites
several to go to a dance or agrees to carry them
because he is going there himself, there is in a
sense a common purpose; but no sound decision
ever imputed the driver's negligence to the guests
just because they were all pleasure riding and
meant to enjoy themselves together or separately at the journey's end. Such a joint venture
or common enterprise as makes occupants of
a car mutual agents and principlals in the operation of the car is one in which the business they
are on or which they intend to do on the outcome
of the journey involves such a community of
interest and obligations as will make the trip
itself an integral part of such venture, and
therefore each throughout the trip is the agent
of the other, not only for the purpose to be
accomplished by the journey, but in the journey
itself. The purpose for which they are being
transported and the thing which they intend to
do must involve such a community of interest
as to make each the agent of the other in the
actual accomplishment of that final purpose,
so that there is derived from the mutual agency
in the control and operation of the car on the
journey which is an inseparable incident from
the purpose on which they are going, the pur-
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pose and the trip itself being considered as one
whole transaction in which throughout there is I
a reciprocal agency or a cross-relationship of
agent .a1:1d principal. .The nature of the thiug
to be JOmtly accomplished makes the trip itself '
a part of that purpose. * * *"
1

See also 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Autornobiles and Highway
Traffic, Sec. 679, page 230 and 48 A.L.R. 1055, 1061.
In applying the foregoing principles to the case
at bar, it is clear all of the elements listed have been
established by the testimony of the parties.
The parties testified as to their agreernent; their
community of purpose; their equal right to control and
their agreement to share equally all of the expenses
and costs of the trip. The foregoing facts are supported
by the record. Plaintiff is at a loss to understand what
additional proof is necessary to establish the legal
relationship of joint enterprise.
Plaintiff submits this case presents a classic situation of two persons banding together to jointly accom·
plish a common goal. Plaintiff respectfully submits
that for a court to conclude, as a matter of law, that
the testimony of the parties did not at least raise an
issue of fact as to whether they were engaged in a joint
enterprise, is to completely ignore the testimony of the
parties and the proper inferences to be drawn therefrom. We submit this is not a case where two mutual
friends were embarking on a trip to the corner drug
store for a soda or on a duck hunting trip, but this is
a case where two people, 1.500 miles from their home.
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,

,
'

,

were joined together for not only their mutual benefit,
but because of necessity. It is our position that when
these parties obtained the automobile and commenced
, the trip to California, each had a vested interest in the
automobile and the trip and each had an equal voice
and right to be heard respecting the details of the
journey.

1

In view of the testimony contained in the depositions and considering the same in the light most favor' able to plaintiff, we respectfully submit a jury question
\\'as presented regarding the legal relationship of the
parties and the decision of the pretrial judge was error.

POINT III
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE 'VAS PRECLUDED FRO"M CONSIDERING A MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDG~IENT.
Plaintiff respectfully submits the pretrial judge
was precluded from entertaining the Motion for a Summary .Judgment. As the court will recall, on August
20, 1905, Judge Keller, in denying the same motion,
stated in a memorandum decision as follows:

~ '

"I conclude from the allegation of the defendant Aaron's answer that he and the plaintiff
were engaged in a joint or common enterprise
at the time of the plaintiff's alleged injuries

* * *"
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Plaintiff respectfully submits that in view of tht 1
foregoing decision, the pretrial judge abused his ck ·
cretion in reconsidering the motion.
\Ve submit that a party is entitled to rely on decisions made by judges and the pretrial judge should
have deferred a ruling on the issue of joint enterprise
until all of the evidence had been presented to him and
the parties had rested. The court would then have been ,
in a position to consider the merit of Judge Keller1 .
decision. Therefore, we respectfully submit the court '
should reverse the decision of the pretrial judge.

POINT IV
THERE 'VAS AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
WILL:F'UL MISCONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT.

1

'Vhile plaintiff does not concede he was a passenger
in the automobile and not abandoning the argument
made under the other points of this brief, plaintifi
respectfully submits there was an issue of fact regarding
the willful misconduct of defendant. As the court will i
recall, defendant was traveling at approximately 50 ·
miles per hour when he suddenly became aware he:
was approaching a curve. In view of his excessi1e ·
speed, he was unable to negotiate the curve and there-.
fore the automobile left the road, overturned and caused
injuries to plaintiff.
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It is the position of plaintiff that reasonable minds
' could conclude that defendant, in driving at such an
excessive rate of speed in an area of which he was
unfamiliar constituted willful misconduct.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above set forth, and in the interest
of justice, it is respectfully submitted that this Court
should reverse the District Court ruling and remand
the case for a trial by jury.
Respectfully submitted,
RA,VLINGS, 'VALLACE, ROBERTS
& BLACK
Richard C. Dibblee
Attorneys for Appellant
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